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Abstract John Worrall (1989) famously claimed that structural realism is the
best of both worlds; it enables one to endorse the best arguments for scientific
realism and antirealism. In this paper, I argue that structural realism also
enables one to combine two other seemingly inconsistent positions: realism
and pluralism. Indeed, the very features which form the basis of the structural
realist’s reply to the problem of theory change may be applied synchronically
to allow for a pluralist structural realism. The resulting position incorporates
a robust variety of scientific pluralism unavailable to the traditional realist and
thereby allows the structural realist to take seriously the pluralism apparent
in scientific practice.
1 Introduction
A flat-footed look at scientific practice reveals a kind of pluralism; it sometimes
happens that multiple models or theories are applied to the same target. For
example, Morrison (2011) describes the plurality of models of turbulent flows
used in fluid dynamics and the diversity of incompatible models for the atomic
nucleus deployed by physicists.1 Philosophers of science may take a variety of
attitudes toward such pluralism in practice, but for those who wish to take
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Synthese. The final
authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02333-3
David Glick
Department of Philosophy
University of Sydney
E-mail: david.glick@sydney.edu.au
1 Morrison notes that there is an important difference between these two cases—the former
models are compatible in a way the latter aren’t—but at this stage, the point is simply that
both serve as examples of pluralism in practice. A number of examples from biology are
given by Mitchell (2003) in defense of her ‘integrative pluralism’. See also Kellert et al.
(2006) for examples from across the sciences.
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current scientific practice as a guide, there is some motivation to incorporate
pluralism in one’s philosophy of science—that is, to regard pluralism as a
feature of healthy science rather than a defect or temporary phase in scientific
development.
One challenge in endorsing pluralism is the apparent conflict with scientific
realism. Below I will argue that the conflict is only apparent. If one adopts
a form of structural realism, pluralism can be reconciled with realism. More-
over, the variety of pluralism allowed by structural realism—‘robust scientific
pluralism’—is stronger than what the traditional realist can admit. This is a
benefit insofar as one seeks to take seriously the pluralism found in our sci-
entific practice. Thus, pluralism provides another path to structural realism
apart from the historical problem of theory change and issues in contemporary
physics often appealed to by structural realists.
The paper will proceed as follows. The remainder of this section aims to
clarify the challenge to scientific realism presented by pluralism. Section 2
characterizes robust scientific pluralism and distinguishes it from other forms
of scientific pluralism. Section 3 briefly outlines structural realism, which I un-
derstand as a stance in the sense of van Fraassen’s (2008a) empirical stance.
In section 4, I argue that structural realism—both in several extant accounts
and more generally—can allow for robust scientific pluralism. The resulting
position, pluralist structural realism, does not require any substantial modi-
fication of structural realism, but rather follows from the structural realist’s
antecedent commitments and aims. I then consider two further questions fac-
ing pluralist structural realism: (a) what makes a certain plurality of theories
or models acceptable? (section 5) and (b) is pluralist structural realism still
realism? (section 6). Finally, I conclude with a brief application to a con-
temporary scientific theory that has challenged realist interpreters: algebraic
quantum field theory (section 7).
1.1 The pluralist challenge
To demonstrate the conflict between pluralism and realism, consider the fol-
lowing rough characterizations:
Pluralism: One can accept multiple inequivalent theories dealing with the
same phenomenon.
Realism: Acceptance of a theory involves a commitment to it providing a
faithful representation of the world.
Immediately one can see a tension between pluralism and realism. Plu-
ralism allows for the acceptance of a plurality of theories that (a) have the
same target and (b) are genuinely inequivalent. The former condition rules
out a sort of piecemeal approach in which different theories deal with different
bits of the world and hence never come in conflict (cf., Cartwright’s (1999)
‘dappled world’). The latter rules out the possibility that the plurality may
be reduced to a single theoretical account of the phenomena that admits of
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several presentations. The content of realism turns on what counts as a ‘faith-
ful representation’ of the world. If one takes it to be strict literal truth (in
the correspondence sense), then combining realism with pluralism seems to
require giving up either (a) classical logic and/or (b) metaphysical realism.
Suppose theories in the plurality disagree about some proposition p. Then, if
we take them all to be strictly true, p ∧ ¬p will be true. Another apparent
consequence would be that the world is such that p and such that ¬p, contra
the assumption of metaphysical realism, i.e., that there is mind-independent
world free of contradictory states of affairs.2
Of course, scientific realists typically regard approximate truth as the rel-
evant theory/world relation, and it’s less clear that this precludes pluralism.
One reason for this is a lack of consensus in the realist’s notion of approximate
truth. But, regardless of how the details are spelled out, the appeal to approx-
imate truth doesn’t obviously avoid the tension with pluralism. For instance,
one could follow Larry Laudan in claiming that “a realist would never want to
say that a theory was approximately true if its central theoretical terms failed
to refer” (Laudan, 1981, 33). More generally, it’s difficult to make sense of how
theories with different core ontological commitments can each be taken to ap-
proximate the world on the traditional realist picture. Intuitively, such theories
assert that there are different things in the world, so it doesn’t seem possible
that more than one can capture what the world is like, even approximately.
Indeed, the notion of one ontology approximating another seems altogether
mysterious.3
The forgoing falls short of establishing the incompatibility of pluralism and
realism, even when the latter is understood in terms of approximate truth. As
we will see in the next section, there are moves open to the realist who seeks to
incorporate some degree of pluralism. The point is rather that the realist faces
an apparent challenge: how can one coherently accept both pluralism and re-
alism without compromising either thesis? Below, I will argue that structural
realism allows one to answer the challenge in a way unavailable to the tra-
ditional realist. Before doing so, however, let’s consider how the traditional
realist may respond to the challenge. This will also serve to clarify what is
required of a robust scientific pluralism.
2 The issue of inconsistency in science is complex and deserving of a careful analysis.
Here I simply take it for granted that inconsistent collections of theories or models are
used in science and that we wish to preserve classical logic. For a detailed investigation of
inconsistency in science, see Vickers (2013).
3 I return to this point in section 4.3 below. For now, note that the traditional scientific
realist endorses the unobservable ontology of accepted theories—indeed, this is sometimes
taken as analytic—which precludes acceptance of ontologically-incompatible theories. Thus,
the traditional realist must either abandon their view of ontological commitment or limit
the pluralism they are willing to admit.
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2 Robust scientific pluralism
Two key concepts that figure in the initial statements of pluralism and realism
above deserve further scrutiny: acceptance and equivalence. In this section,
I will argue that the traditional realist can understand each of these terms
in a way that will permit a form of pluralism, but in doing so threatens to
compromise one or both of the theses.
2.1 Acceptance
If acceptance requires something less than truth, then a plurality of inequiv-
alent theories can be accepted without fear of contradiction. However, as a
general position, this move threatens to conflict with realism. It is central to
the traditional realist understanding that the acceptance of a scientific theory
involves the belief that it is true, at least approximately. Perhaps, then, the re-
alist should restrict their claim to the context in which the plurality of theories
occurs. On such a view one cannot accept a plurality of inequivalent theories,
but can nevertheless ‘take them on’ or ‘entertain’ them in some sense. Thus,
we arrive at a hybrid approach. Ordinarily, acceptance of theories involves a
commitment to their truth, but in permissible cases of pluralism acceptance
lacks such commitment. While such a view may be able to make sense of the
pluralism of practice, it does so at the cost of robust pluralism by denying the
following condition.
Parity: One should be willing to accept multiple inequivalent theories in the
same sense of ‘acceptance’ as appropriate to theories taken in isolation.
Note that Parity does not require the presence of other theories to be ir-
relevant; there are certainly situations in which the status we give to a theory
should be affected by the presence of rivals.4 The point is rather that a ro-
bust pluralist must be willing to treat more than one theory as adequate in
the same sense as a single theory is adequate. For the traditional realist, such
adequacy involves approximate truth, so Parity requires that inequivalent the-
ories can each be approximately true, in contrast to the hybrid strategy under
consideration.
2.2 Equivalence
Another strategy open to the realist is to scrutinize the sense in which the
theories endorsed by the pluralist are inequivalent. One instance of this strat-
egy seeks to render inequivalent theories consistent via a reinterpretation. If
superficially inequivalent theories agree at a deeper level, then the traditional
realist is free to endorse all of the them. There are several problems with this
approach, however. First, reinterpretation of this sort threatens to be ad hoc
4 Although, it’s often difficult to say when. See section 5 below.
Pluralist Structural Realism 5
and capable of rendering any theories equivalent when ‘properly understood’.
Second, a central feature of scientific realism is its willingness to take theories
at face-value and commit to their literal (approximate) truth. A willingness
to reinterpret theories to resolve conflicts is a strategy more associated with
forms of antirealism. Third, even if one allows for such a reinterpretation, the
resulting pluralism is quite weak. Given that the theories agree once inter-
preted properly, the sense in which they are inequivalent is to a certain extent
only apparent; ultimately, there is only one representation of the world that
admits of more than one formulation. This runs afoul of another condition on
robust pluralism:
Content: One should allow for theories which are genuinely inequivalent by
the lights of the version of realism or antirealism one adopts.
Content rules out versions of pluralism—such as that just sketched—which
allow for theories that are inequivalent by the lights of others, but equivalent by
the lights of one’s own view. This captures the sense in which pluralism should
be a more substantive thesis than merely admitting of multiple formulations
or notational variants of a single theory. For example, a logical positivist may
readily accept several empirically equivalent theories regarded as inequivalent
by the realist, but in so doing does not endorse a robust form of pluralism. By
contrast, a constructive empiricist (in the sense of van Fraassen (1980)) may
regard empirically equivalent theories as genuinely inequivalent, provided they
differ in what they say about the unobservable.5 Thus, for the constructive
empiricist, Content would be satisfied by allowing for the acceptance of such
a plurality, which includes theories that are inequivalent by their own lights.6
Content does not rule out all equivalence-based strategies for meeting
the challenge of pluralism. For example, Chakravartty (2011), discusses a
metaphysical-natures based pluralism according to which theories may dis-
agree about the details of their shared (core) ontological commitments. Con-
sider two theories that both mention electrons, but ascribe different features
to them. Even if we grant that wholesale ontological inequivalence is problem-
atic (for the reasons given above), it seems that these theories can each be
approximately true, as long as (a) there are electrons and (b) their features
are approximately like those described by both theories under consideration.
Thus, there does seem to be room for a version of pluralism that allows for the-
ories that are inequivalent with respect to metaphysical-natures but equivalent
in their core ontological commitments.
5 And, because the constructive empiricist is committed to semantic realism, they will
agree with the (traditional) realist about what theories say about the (putative) unobserv-
able.
6 This would require a departure from van Fraassen’s original version of the view, which
holds that certain non-doxastic commitments preclude simultaneously accepting more than
one theory in a given area of inquiry (van Fraassen, 1980, 88). Note as well that matters
are different on the empiricist structuralism of van Fraassen (2008b). On this view, theories
are understood in terms of abstract structures describable only up to isomorphism (238).
Thus, allowing for a plurality of empirically equivalent theories that differ in their traditional
realist content may not satisfy Content; one would have to add that the members of the
plurality are non-isomorphic.
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Metaphysical-natures pluralism must walk a fine line between allowing gen-
uine inequivalence and avoiding disagreement about core ontology. Consider
again the case of electrons. Chakravartty regards a theory that takes subatomic
particles to be field excitations and another that takes them to be roughly sim-
ilar to classical particles as disagreeing not about what there is, but about its
metaphysical nature. However, even if one isn’t an essentialist about electrons,
this understanding is somewhat strained. Rival understandings of quantum
field theory do seem to disagree about fundamental ontology; defenders of a
field interpretation think that fundamentally there are no particles and that
they—or particle-like phenomena—only emerge at a suitable level of descrip-
tion.7 Moreover, the metaphysical-natures view also faces a difficult choice
between underdetermination and indeterminacy about fundamental ontology.
On this view, electrons either (a) have metaphysical natures about which we
cannot know or (b) have genuinely indeterminate metaphysical natures. The
former option introduces an unwelcome element of humility into realism; our
best scientific theories are incapable of providing a full account of how things
are. The latter option eschews this humility, but does so at the cost of positing
metaphysical indeterminacy, a quite controversial commitment.
2.3 Robust scientific pluralism
A robust scientific pluralism (RSP) should respect both Parity and Content. It
must be open to the pluralist to accept—in the relevant sense of ‘acceptance’—
a plurality of genuinely inequivalent theories in a given area. It’s worth noting
that robust scientific pluralism differs from other notions of scientific pluralism
that have been discussed in the literature. First, consider methodological plu-
ralism. According to methodological pluralism, one should allow—or perhaps
promote—the pursuance of a plurality of theories in a given area of inquiry.
Methodological pluralism is a significantly weaker thesis than robust scientific
pluralism. It is compatible with—perhaps even recommended by—an under-
lying monistic view according to which there is one best theory to be found; of
course we should pursue multiple avenues until we hit upon the correct one!8
RSP is stronger because it allows not only pursuance but acceptance of the
plurality. By rejecting Parity, methodological pluralism fails to be robust.
Second, consider what is sometimes called metaphysical pluralism. This
view rejects metaphysical monism, the thesis that there is one way the world
is (fundamentally).9 Metaphysical pluralism isn’t about our theories or mod-
els, but rather the world itself; it claims that (somehow) our world is both P
and Q, where these are genuinely inequivalent ways of being. Whether such
a metaphysical pluralism is coherent is a matter of debate, but it’s certainly
7 For arguments against particle and field interpretations, respectively, see Fraser (2008)
and Baker (2009).
8 Cf., Chang (2012, 270–271), who defends this sort of reasoning in terms of bet hedging.
9 Perhaps the ‘promiscuous realism’ of Dupre´ (1993) is a version of metaphysical pluralism.
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stronger than RSP. Below I will argue that RSP is compatible with meta-
physical monism. For now, note that RSP is a claim about our stance toward
scientific theories.10 It holds that we can adopt the same stance toward a gen-
uine plurality of theories that one adopts toward a successful theory taken
in isolation. This might have implications for metaphysics, but these need to
be carefully worked out. Metaphysical pluralism would certainly result if one
added to RSP the claim that theories provide a complete and perfectly accu-
rate representation of the world, but no plausible form of realism would assert
such a tight connection between theories and the world. In lieu of such a con-
nection, the metaphysical consequences are less obvious; they will depend on
the precise details of the theory/world relation.
Thus, RSP is situated roughly between methodological and metaphysical
pluralism. It deserves the title ‘robust’ because it requires the genuine accep-
tance of inequivalent theories, but it is not, in the first instance, a metaphysical
thesis. Another version of pluralism that seeks this middle ground is the active
normative epistemic pluralism of Chang (2012), which may be characterized
roughly as follows.
I would define pluralism in science as the doctrine advocating the culti-
vation of multiple systems of practice in any given field of science. By a
‘system of practice’ I mean a coherent and interacting set of epistemic
activities performed with a view to achieve certain aims. (Chang, 2012,
260)
Chang’s view shares some important features with RSP. For instance, his
pluralism does not presuppose metaphysical pluralism or that the world is
highly complex (Chang, 2012, 292–293). This is consistent with RSP, which
also avoids (direct) commitments about the nature of reality. However, there
are at least two important contrasts with RSP. The first is that Chang’s plural-
ism is more active and normative than required by RSP. Whereas he advocates
for the use of a plurality of scientific systems, RSP claims only that pluralities
of theories may, in certain circumstances, be acceptable in the same way a
single theory is. As discussed below, RSP doesn’t provide explicit necessary
and sufficient conditions for when a plurality is acceptable, nor does it claim
that pluralities are epistemically superior to single theories in general. Second,
Chang’s pluralism concerns the cultivation of systems of practice, which is
quite different from the theory-based (or model-based) understanding of RSP.
On RSP, the plurality comprises inequivalent theories or models that may be
accepted, which is quite different from Chang’s broadly pragmatist conception
of cultivating systems of practice. Chang emphasizes that his pluralism does
include an epistemic component, but this seems to fall short of acceptance, at
least when the latter is understood in realist terms.
RSP aims to take to heart the practices that motivate scientific plural-
ism. The fact that scientists often work with multiple, inequivalent theoretical
10 By ‘stance’ I mean the attitude(s) one adopts toward a scientific theory. For instance, a
traditional realist stance toward a theory T would involve a commitment to the approximate
truth of T , while an empiricist stance would not (van Fraassen, 2008a).
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accounts of a given range of phenomena is taken to show that multiple theo-
ries can be accepted, even when they are genuinely inequivalent. By contrast,
methodological pluralism weakens acceptance as it applies to the plurality
(thereby violating Parity). Metaphysical pluralism is compatible with RSP,
but not entailed by it unless acceptance requires exact literal truth in the cor-
respondence sense, which realists should reject. Chang’s view doesn’t neatly
fall into either of these categories, but it clearly differs from RSP in impor-
tant ways. RSP is compatible with various forms of empiricism or antirealism.
However, while it’s not especially difficult to see how robust pluralism might
be embraced by the antirealist,11 the real challenge concerns whether some
version of scientific realism is compatible with RSP. Can we accept theories
that are inequivalent on a realist understanding of both key terms?
3 Structural realism
In the next section, I will argue that structural realism can accommodate
RSP.12 Before doing so, we should get clear on what is meant by the former
thesis. There have been many discussions of structural realism and nearly
as many ways of understanding the position. The present understanding is
motivated by the problem of theory change in the (general) philosophy of
science.
The problem of theory change begins from the observation of discontinuity
across large-scale theoretical changes in science. Clear examples of such dis-
continuity include the sort of revolutions that inspired Kuhn—the Copernican
revolution, the chemical revolution, the special theory of relativity—but even
more subtle cases seem to create a problem for the realist. One way to see
the problem is by following Laudan (1981), for whom the history of science is
replete with counterexamples to the realist inference from empirical success to
approximate truth. If approximate truth requires successful reference (as noted
above), and currently accepted theories faithfully represent what there is, then
many past theories cannot be approximately true despite their empirical suc-
cess. The standard example discussed by structural realists is drawn from the
11 If acceptance requires something less than (approximate) correspondence truth, there is
no substantial difficulty in accepting a plurality of theories. Indeed, if acceptance is made suf-
ficiently weak, antirealist pluralism collapses into methodological pluralism—i.e., the claim
that we can use a plurality of theories or models of the same system.
12 To be clear, I will not argue here that structural realism is the correct account of
scientific theories, or even that it withstands criticisms that allege it is untenable or collapses
into traditional forms of realism or antirealism. There have been several such objections
made to the viability of structural realism. Two well known objections are (1) that the
distinction between ‘structure’ and ‘nature’ cannot be sustained (Psillos, 2006) and (2)
Newman’s objection that claims about the structure of reality are trivially true (Newman,
1928; Demopoulos and Friedman, 1985). Addressing these important objections would take
us too far afield and distract from the central aim of the paper: to establish the compatibility
of pluralism and structural realism.
Pluralist Structural Realism 9
history of optics.13 Fresnel’s theory of light, the story goes, views light as a
disturbance in a mechanical ether and from features of this ether derives em-
pirically successful equations of reflection and refraction. Today, we no longer
believe such an ether exists, so we are apparently forced to regard Fresnel’s
theory as false—not even approximately true. Perhaps this pronouncement is
not so troubling for the realist, but the real problem is that if such discon-
tinuity is the norm in science, we would expect that we are currently in a
situation not dissimilar from Fresnel—our best confirmed theories will also
be superseded by ontologically inconsistent future theories. This is a version
of the ‘pessimistic meta-induction’ that threatens to undermine the realist’s
claim that today’s best confirmed scientific theories are approximately true.
The structural realist solution to the problem of theory change attempts to
locate continuity across theory change by focusing on structure. The guiding
intuition is nicely captured by Poincare´’s remarks on Fresnel’s equations:
They teach us now, as they did then, that there is such and such a
relation between this thing and that; only, the something which we
then called motion, we now call electric current. But these are merely
names of the images we substituted for the real objects which Nature
will hide for ever from our eyes. The true relations between these real
objects are the only reality we can attain, and the sole condition is that
the same relations shall exist between these objects as between the
images we are forced to put in their place. If the relations are known to
us, what does it matter if we think it convenient to replace one image
by another? (Poincare´, 1905, 179)
Poincare´’s idea was revived by Worrall to give rise to the contemporary struc-
tural realist position on Fresnel and Maxwell:
...although from the point of view of Maxwell’s theory, Fresnel entirely
misidentified the nature of light, his theory accurately described not
just light’s observable effects but its structure. There is no elastic solid
ether. There is, however, from the later point of view, a (disembodied)
electromagnetic field. The field in no clear sense approximates the ether,
but disturbances in it do obey formally similar laws to those obeyed
by elastic disturbances in a mechanical medium. Although Fresnel was
quite wrong about what oscillates, he was, from this later point of view,
right, not just about the optical phenomena, but right also that these
phenomena depend on the oscillations of something or other at right
angles to the light. (Worrall, 1989, 118, original emphasis)
The structural realist solution to the problem of theory change has been
challenged from a number of directions and the case of Fresnel and Maxwell
13 A number of other episodes of theory change have been discussed by structural realists.
For example: Ptolemaic and Copernican astronomy (Saunders, 1993), classical mechanics
and special relativity (Brown 1993), classical and quantum electrodynamics (Lyre, 2004),
phologiston theory and oxygen theory (Ladyman, 2011). In each of these cases, structural
realists acknowledge that there is ontological discontinuity, but allege that some measure of
continuity can be recovered at the level of structure.
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widely scrutinized. It is not my intention here to defend the claims of Poincare´
and Worrall, but rather, to show how the version of structural realism they
suggest allows for RSP. To that end, it will be useful to highlight two features
of the putative solution to the problem of theory change offered by structural
realism.
First, the solution involves making a concession to the antirealist. The
structural realist grants that many of the ontological commitments of the tra-
ditional realist must be abandoned. The only aspect of a successful scientific
theory toward which we should adopt a realist attitude is its structure, where
that is understood as what is encoded by the equations of the theory. This
is what allows the structural realist to shrug off the apparent ontological dis-
continuity as the result of the “images” with which we clothe the underlying
structure. In particular, Laudan’s worry is avoided because earlier theories
describe something we still (and always will) believe in, namely, structure.
Second, the structural realist needn’t claim that structure is preserved
exactly. One may note that structures themselves can change during episodes
of theory change (Redhead, 2001). Even in the case of Fresnel and Maxwell, one
can only recover the equations of the former theory from the latter as a special
case given certain assumptions (Saatsi, 2005). However, the structural realist
only needs to claim that there is continuity to be found across changes in theory
(Votsis, 2010). Just as the traditional realist only claims approximate truth
for today’s best confirmed theories, the structural realist should only claim
that they approximately capture the structure of the world. Of course, making
precise this notion of approximating the world’s structure is a challenge for the
structural realist, but the same could be said for the traditional realist’s notion
of approximate truth. Neither view is plausible if an exact match between the
world and our best theories (or their models) is required.
3.1 ESR and OSR
The presentation so far has ignored the important distinction between epis-
temic and ontic varieties of structural realism (Ladyman, 1998). Roughly, epis-
temic structural realism (ESR) holds that structure is all we can know and
ontic structural realism (OSR) that structure is all there is. While the distinc-
tion between ESR and OSR is important for many purposes, it is orthogonal
to our focus here; both forms of structural realism allow for RSP. The crucial
point is that all structural realists, properly so-called, take a realist attitude
toward structure and only structure.14 Whether they are theistic, agnostic or
atheistic about putative non-structural features of the world is another mat-
ter. But, as I will argue below, it is this modest commitment, in conjunction
with a claim about ‘looseness of fit’ between the theory and the world, that
allows for pluralism.
14 As with pluralism, I understand structural realism as a stance. In particular, a stance
that adopts a realist attitude toward structure and only structure.
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That my focus crosscuts this distinction is also made clear by considering
the level at which RSP operates. Again, the pluralism I’m concerned to defend
is not a metaphysical thesis; it concerns only the stance we take toward a
plurality of theories. Thus, whether the world is ‘just structure’ or there is
something supporting that structure is beyond its scope. In what follows I wish
to remain neutral with respect to all such matters; the fundamental ontology
of our world could comprise: (1) a single structure, (2) a plurality of structures,
(3) a collection of objects and/or properties that realizes a single structure, (4)
a collection of objects and/or properties that realizes a plurality of structures.
At times I may tacitly assume one metaphysical picture or another for the
sake of demonstration, but I hope to make it clear that nothing turns on it.
4 Pluralist structural realism
The structural realist is better positioned to respond to the challenge of plu-
ralism than her traditional realist rival. In particular, RSP—as captured by
Parity and Content—can be embraced by the structural realist.
Parity: One should be willing to accept multiple inequivalent theories in the
same sense of ‘acceptance’ as appropriate to theories taken in isolation.
Suppose we have two inequivalent theories that both meet the (structural)
realist’s threshold for empirical success. Can the structural realist grant that
both faithfully represent the world? The answer seems to be straightforwardly
‘yes’. Consider the case of Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics and Schro¨dinger’s
wave mechanics. According to Schro¨dinger’s theory, the state of the system—
represented by its wavefunction ψ—changes as a function of time and the
operators that act on it are time-independent. By contrast, Heisenberg’s ma-
trix mechanics takes states to be constant and the operators to change as as
a function of time. These two theories concern the same subject matter—the
world of the very small described by quantum mechanics—and are inequiva-
lent in that they disagree about the nature of states and operators. For the
structural realist, however, there is no difficulty claiming that both describe
the structure of the world. The reason why is that, as proven by Dirac and
von Neumann, both represent the same structure: a Hilbert space acted on
by linear operators. So, this represents one way in which the structural realist
can adopt pluralism: two theories that are incompatible by the lights of the
traditional realist are structurally equivalent (isomorphic). In such cases the
structural realist has no difficulty saying both theories faithfully represent the
structure of the world.
The pluralist may still want more, however. For one thing, those cases
in which two theories are isomorphic may be relatively rare. In addition, it’s
not clear that the traditional realist has to regard them as distinct theories.
In the above case, the realist may reasonably claim that matrix mechanics
and wave mechanics are different descriptions of the same underlying theory
(they are commonly referred to as the Schro¨dinger and Heisenberg pictures).
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More significantly, the pluralism involved in such cases is to a certain extent
only apparent. Given that the structural realist cares only about structure,
it’s not clear what basis there could be for distinguishing between isomorphic
theories. Just as the logical positivist identifies empirically equivalent theories,
so it would seem the structural realist should identify isomorphic ones.15 This
would seem to suggest that A and B aren’t genuinely distinct. In such cases,
there is one way the world is and one way (multiply described) the theory in
question represents it as being.
Even if the structural realist is able to regard isomorphic theories as dis-
tinct, the variety of pluralism that results will be quite weak. In particular, it
doesn’t satisfy Content.
Content: One should allow for theories which are genuinely inequivalent by
the lights of the version of realism or antirealism one adopts.
Only if a structural realist can allow for cases in which the plurality contains
theories that are inequivalent by their own lights can they endorse RSP. Thus,
it is not enough to point to cases of alleged isomorphic theories with differ-
ent (traditional realist) ontological commitments—as some authors have—to
establish robust pluralism.16 Can structural realism allow for such cases?
In considering this question, it’s helpful to recall the discussion of the-
ory change above. The structural realist solution to the problem of theory
change claimed that earlier scientific theories could be rendered consistent
with their successors. The key to restoring the continuity was to (a) jettison
the commitment to an ontology of objects and intrinsic properties and (b)
to find continuity at the level of structure. If this approach is successful in
that context, one might wonder whether it can be adapted to make room for
genuine structural realist pluralism. Indeed, it seems that if the structural re-
alist’s response to the problem of theory change is successful, then one already
has an instance of RSP in which the relevant theories occur on either side of
a significant theory change in a given area of interest. The optical theories
of Fresnel and Maxwell, for instance, are non-isomorphic while each may be
taken to faithfully represent the structure of the world. Of course, there is one
significant difference between the cases: in the problem of theory change we
sought diachronic consistency while pluralism concerns a synchronic plurality
of theories.
Some aspects of the structural realist solution to theory change carry over
straightforwardly to the synchronic case. For example, the traditional realist
15 Halvorson (2012), for instance, takes this to be a commitment of structural realism. He
goes on to challenge isomorphism as a criterion of theoretical equivalence. However, one
might imagine a structural realist who agrees with the traditional realist about theoretical
equivalence, but differs in what they take acceptance to involve. Such a view would seek to
combine semantic realism with a structuralist view of ontological commitment in the way
van Fraassen (1980) sought to combine semantic realism with empiricism. On this variant
of structural realism, the acceptance of isomorphic theories may be sufficient for RSP. I will
ignore this possibility in what follows, but note here that it may provide another route to
pluralist structural realism. Thanks to xxxx for this suggestion.
16 This is the sort of ontological pluralism discussed by McArthur (2006), for example.
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who wishes to allow for a plurality of theories faces the problem of compet-
ing ontologies. In the case of theory change, the problem is that getting the
ontology right is a plausible necessary condition for approximate truth, but
past theories don’t meet this requirement (by the lights of currently accepted
theories). Similarly, if current theories in a given field of inquiry disagree about
ontology, at most one can be approximately true for the traditional realist. This
worry is avoided by the structural realist. If only structure is taken to have
representational import, then differences in (non-structural) ontology among
rival theories pose no impediment to more than one faithfully representing
the world. This allows for the kind of modest pluralism discussed above—
isomorphic theories with apparently different ontological commitments can be
endorsed. But, how can theories that attribute different structures to the world
both be endorsed?
To answer this question more needs to be said about the notion of a theory
‘faithfully representing the world’ according to structural realism. As with ap-
proximate truth for the traditional realist, there is no consensus among struc-
tural realists here. My strategy will be to consider two different approaches
that have been discussed in the literature. I will argue that each allows for
RSP. This leaves open the possibility of an alternative structural realist un-
derstanding of the theory/world relation without the features that enable RSP,
but I will offer some reasons to think this is unlikely.
4.1 Partial structures, partial morphisms and quasi-truth
One account of the relations between scientific structures is the view developed
and defended by Newton Da Costa and collaborators (da Costa and French,
2003; Bueno and da Costa, 2007). On this view, theoretical models are as-
sociated with partial structures that are related by partial morphisms and
assessed in terms of quasi-truth. Such a view allows that inequivalent—even
inconsistent—theories may each be quasi-true, allowing for a robust variety of
pluralism.
In ordinary set theory, a structure is an ordered pair that consists of a
domain D and a set of relations Ri that hold between them, that is, S =
〈D,Ri〉i∈I . Each of the relations Ri is defined extensionally as a set of (n-
tuples of) the elements of D. Partial structures have the same form, except
that relations are replaced by partial relations. An n-place partial relation R
is defined as a triple 〈R1, R2, R3〉, where R1, R2, and R3 are mutually disjoint
sets, with R1∪R2∪R3 = Dn, and such that R1 is the set of n-tuples that (we
know) belong to R, R2 is the set of n-tuples that (we know) do not belong
to R, and R3 is the set of n-tuples for which we do not know whether they
belong to R. In the special case in which R3 is empty, R is an ordinary n-
place relation which can be identified with R1. A partial structure, then, is an
ordered pair 〈D,Ri〉i∈I , where D is a non-empty set, and (Ri)i∈I is a family
of partial relations defined over D.
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Now that we have the notion of a partial structure, we can consider how
distinct partial structures can be related. An isomorphism between struc-
tures is a bijective mapping f that preserves all of a structure’s relations:
∀x∀y ∈ D(Rxy ⇐⇒ R′f(x)f(y)). A partial isomorphism between par-
tial structures is bijective mapping that f that preserves all relations of the
first and second kind: ∀x∀y ∈ D(R1xy ⇐⇒ R′1f(x)f(y)) and ∀x∀y ∈
D(R2xy ⇐⇒ R′2f(x)f(y)). In the special case in which R3 is empty, a
partial isomorphism is simply an isomorphism. A partial homomorphism can
be defined analogously by dropping the requirement that the mapping is bi-
jective. Finally, a sentence α is quasi-true in a partial structure A just in case
there is a full structure B that is an ‘A-normal structure’ in which α is true in
the ordinary model-theoretic (i.e., Tarskian) sense. An ‘A-normal structure’ is
defined as one (1) which shares the domain of A, (2) in which every constant
of a given language is interpreted by the same object as in A, and (3) whose
relations extend the corresponding relations in A so that each relation of arity
n, is defined for all n-tuples of elements of D.
As emphasized by its defenders, this framework allows for the quasi-truth
of inequivalent theories.
An important feature to note here is that a sentence and its negation
can be both quasi-true. Of course, inconsistent sentences are not quasi-
true in the same A-normal structure, but they can still be both quasi-
true—as long as they are true in some A-normal structure. (Bueno and
da Costa, 2007, 390, original emphasis)
Bueno and da Costa are concerned to defend the possibility of accepting a
single scientific theory that is internally inconsistent, such a Bohr’s atomic
theory (cf., da Costa and French, 2003, ch.5). They propose to do this by
identifying sub-theories of the inconsistent theory that are each quasi-true
in the sense defined above. The case of a plurality of distinct inequivalent
theories is even more clear. As Vickers observes, “...it isn’t hard to see how
the [partial structures] approach could be extended to cover cases of inter-
theory inconsistency, such as that between general relativity and quantum
theory: an inconsistent theory of quantum gravity could be represented by a
class of partial structures” (Vickers, 2009, 245). Because the partial structures
approach allows for the quasi-truth of inequivalent (and even inconsistent)
claims, one can regard more than one inequivalent theory as quasi-true. So
long as the partial structures associated with each theory can be extended
into corresponding full structures, then we may regard each theory as quasi-
true, despite their inequivalence.
The partial structures approach offers one way of explicating the structural
realist’s claim that theories capture the structure of the world. On this view,
when one accepts a theory, they are committing to the quasi-truth of its claims
and the (partially) faithful representation of its partial structures (da Costa
and French, 2003, 21). A consequence of this is that one can accept—in the
partial structures sense of ‘acceptance’—more than one inequivalent theory.
Each of these theories will be quasi-true in the associated partial structures.
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Thus, the partial structures approach allows for RSP: genuinely inquivalent
theories may be accepted in the same sense of acceptance as applies to a single
theory considered in isolation.
4.2 Real patterns
Another way structural realists think about the theory/world relation is in
terms of Dennett’s real patterns. For Dennett, a real pattern is a description
of some data that is more compact than the ‘bit map’ description. Imagine
a screen made up of many pixels. The bit map description would be a speci-
fication of the state of each pixel. A more compact description might be, for
instance, ‘picture of Boris the cat.’ The latter captures a pattern in the data
as much as the former. Some patterns may be more accurate while others may
be more ‘noisy’ but such differences don’t affect their claim to reality. Could
there be two real patterns in the same data that are not equivalent?
Dennett himself clearly thinks so:
...there could be two different, but equally real, patterns discernible in
the noisy world. The rival theorists would not even agree on which parts
of the world were pattern and which were noise, and yet nothing deeper
would settle the issue. (Dennett, 1991, 49)
One of Dennett’s favorite examples is Conway’s Game of Life. The Life
world consists of a discrete configuration of binary systems, cells that may be
‘alive’ or ‘dead’. The state of the Life world evolves deterministically according
to four simple laws. Interestingly, certain boundary conditions give rise to
patterns of behavior that suggest an ontology of higher-level entities—gliders,
eaters, guns, etc.—that obey their own (imperfect) higher-level laws. Moreover,
it has been shown that one can build a universal computer in the Life world.
One crucial step in completing this task is finding a structure to act as an
infinite storage device. This is accomplished by a complex structure known as
‘sliding-block memory’ (Hickerson, 1990).
Now, imagine we have a Life world that instantiates the sliding block mem-
ory pattern, but with some amount of benign noise; there are some random
bits here and there, but treating the system as an infinite storage device is
predictively successful. There are at least two real patterns present in this Life
world: (1) the pattern describing the behavior of gliders, guns and eaters; and
(2) the pattern describing the behavior of an information storage device. Each
pattern will be predictively successful, but they may disagree about what is
part of the pattern and what is noise. For instance, a random glider would be
included in pattern 1, but not 2. Which pattern should be taken as the correct
description of the Life world? The answer, it seems, will depend on the context
in which one asks the question.
This pluralism about real patterns is relevant for structural realism be-
cause several prominent structural realists have advocated understanding the
theory/world relation in terms of real patterns.
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The tentative metaphysical hypothesis of this book, which is open to
empirical falsification, is that there is no fundamental level, that the
real patterns criterion of reality is the last word in ontology, and there
is nothing more to the existence of a structure than what it takes for it
to be a real pattern. (Ladyman and Ross, 2007, 178)
Ladyman and Ross claim that our best confirmed theories describe structures.
Those structures are ‘real’ or present in the world just in case they are real
patterns in (roughly) Dennett’s sense. Thus, even if theories A and B ascribe
different structures to the world, each could be taken to describe the structure
of the world insofar as each describes a real pattern.
4.3 General considerations
The partial structures and real patterns approaches represent two ways in
which structural realists may wish to understand the theory/world relation.
Each allows for RSP; non-isomorphic structures may each be taken to capture
the structure of the world in the relevant sense. Indeed, there is reason to
think that any plausible form of structural realism will allow for pluralism
of this kind. In light of the problem of theory change, structural realists (like
traditional realists) must allow for a certain amount of ‘looseness of fit’ between
theoretical structures and the (structure of the) world. This looseness will take
different forms in different structural realist accounts, but each will admit of
distinct structures that each capture the structure of the world, more or less.
Picturesquely, the structural realist sees different theories as offering dif-
ferent pictures of the world’s structure. If we allow that they are imperfect
representations, we can think of each as providing a structure that is rele-
vantly similar to the structure of the world—if we ‘squint’ each of the models
and the world look the same. Moreover, there is no reason to think that only
one theoretical structure can stand in this relation to (the structure of) the
world, thus making room for pluralism. However this crude picture is made
precise, it seems likely that it will retain the features that allow for pluralism.
Traditional realism cannot make the analogous move because even ‘squint-
ing’ can’t render incompatible ontological commitments consistent. If, for in-
stance, one were a traditional realist about the Game of Life case above, they
would have two rival ontologies—one of gliders and another of logic gates—
that cannot be seen as approximations of one another.17 In Laudan’s terms,
at most such one theory can successfully refer with its central terms. More
generally, inequivalent structures can each approximate the structure of the
world while inequivalent ontologies cannot each approximate the ontology of
17 The realist could take each pattern to approximate the same underlying reality, namely,
the bit map description. This, however, requires taking the ontologies associated with the
higher-level patterns to be reducible to a more fundamental ontology. Thus, this amounts to
the strategy of reinterpretation mentioned in section 2.2 and which violates Content. It also
would be of no help in cases where no such underlying ontology is available, as is plausibly
the case in quantum field theory (see §7).
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the world. It is only by combining the ‘looseness of fit’ that is part of any
plausible scientific realism with the structural realist’s more limited ontologi-
cal commitments that one makes space for a robust form of pluralism.18
5 Consistency
So far, I’ve argued that structural realism makes room for robust pluralism;
the structural realist has the flexibility to accept a plurality of inequivalent
theories with the same target. But it doesn’t follow from this that there are any
actual cases in which one should be pluralistic. The interesting question then
becomes: When should the structural realist endorse multiple non-isomorphic
theories as each (imperfectly) capturing the structure of the world? To return
to the analogy with theory change, what the pluralist structural realist seeks
is a synchronic analog to diachronic continuity.
There are lessons to be drawn from the diachronic case. First, strict isomor-
phism is too strong of a requirement. Just as one shouldn’t demand that struc-
ture is preserved exactly and completely across an episode of theory change,
one should not require of a synchronic plurality of theories that they be iso-
morphic one another. As noted above, only if one maintains that theories
are perfectly accurate representations does such a demand follow, and this is
something no scientific realist should endorse. Second, those aspects that are
preserved are more likely to reflect genuine features of the world (Votsis, 2010).
Thus, if there are common features of the plurality of structures used in the
representation of a given target system, perhaps these are more likely to be
features of the structure of the world. Third, theories will agree at a suitable
limit with each other and other established theories. For example, special rel-
ativity and Newtonian mechanics agree at the low speed limit with each other
and with other theories (e.g., those concerning the physics of materials). Such
agreement at the limit functions as an institutional norm in physics, and may
be required to avoid conflicts in the application of a plurality of theories. Fi-
nally, whatever else we say, some suitable notion of empirical success remains
a necessary condition; any theory the realist regards as approximately true
must meet the minimum requirements of success.
Thus, as a starting point, we might posit the following constraints on an
acceptable plurality of theories:
Empirical success: each theory must meet the minimum conditions for empir-
ical success.
18 The traditional realist who wishes to accommodate inconsistent ontologies will have to
drop the requirement—often taken to be essential to the position—that one should commit
to the existence of the ontology posited by accepted theories. Such a move will remove the
central characteristic distinguishing traditional scientific realism from structural realism.
One might reasonably wonder how a version of realism that isn’t committed to the specific
objects and properties mentioned in our best theories, but only something roughly similar
to them, differs in any substantial manner from structural realism.
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Agreement at the limit: each theory must agree at a suitable limit with other
theories in the plurality and other established theories.
Common features: common features among the plurality of theories—if there
are any—are more likely to represent aspects of the world.
These conditions remain quite permissive. For instance, competing ap-
proaches to quantum mechanics might be seen as meeting the first two condi-
tions. But, these are seen as genuine rivals by their advocates, which suggests
that pluralism is inappropriate in this context. The pluralist structural realist
has at least two means of response. First, she may agree that this plurality
is unacceptable despite meeting the conditions; after all, these conditions are
meant to be necessary, not sufficient. It seems plausible that a certain amount
of good judgement on the part of scientists is required to distinguish unac-
ceptable from acceptable pluralities. Second, the structural realist could take
the revisionary position that the various interpretations are not genuine rivals.
On this view, the diversity of approaches to quantum mechanics each capture
structural aspects of the quantum world, even those that are genuinely in-
equivalent.19 If this is the right way to view the debate, the third condition
suggests we should pay special attention to commonalities among the differ-
ent approaches. For instance, Born’s rule for calculating probabilities from
quantum states appears in some form in all interpretations.20
It is worth considering a stronger condition that has been left off the list
above:
Superstructure: the structures involved in any acceptable plurality must be
embeddable in a single larger structure.
The partial structures approach discussed in section 4.1 is one possible
motivation for such a condition. Suppose that we have two theories, associated
with partial structures S1 and S2, respectively. Theory 1 is quasi-true in S1
just in case there is a full structure F1 that is an extension of S1 and in
which theory 1 is true, and similarly for theory 2, partial structure S2 and
full structure F2. While it is no part of the approach, one might stipulate that
F1 = F2, that is, that there is a single full structure in which both theories
are true; this could be seen as a consistency requirement. However, such a
requirement limits the extent of the pluralism open to the structural realist.
Theories which straightforwardly disagree about the same features of the world
would be ineligible as members of an acceptable plurality. Superstructure,
then, only captures the sense in which each theory is a partial representation,
not an imperfect one. Robust pluralism should allow for the acceptance of
theories that genuinely disagree rather than merely target different parts of
the world.21
19 This seems to be the view endorsed by Chang (2012, 275).
20 This might lead to a view of quantum theory as, first and foremost, a source of proba-
bilities (Caves et al., 2002) or logical constraints (Bub, 1974).
21 The denial of Superstructure will play an important role in the application to QFT
discussed in section 7.
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6 Realism
Given the permissiveness of pluralist structural realism, one may wonder whether
it is still deserving of the title of realism. After all, I have just argued that the
pluralist can endorse a plurality of theories that ascribe different structures to
the same target. If the only constraints are empirical success and agreement
at the limit, then does it not follow that (nearly) anything goes?
There are many ways of understanding what scientific realism demands,
and to some extent the question is merely one of terminology. That said, plu-
ralist structural realism has just as much a claim to being a form of realism as
unmodified structural realism. Structural realists typically appeal to the ‘no
miracles’ argument in defense of their realist credentials. The realist requires
that some explanation be given for the astounding empirical success of our
best scientific theories. The best (or only) explanation is that these theories
faithfully represent the world. The structural realist cashes out ‘faithful rep-
resentation’ in terms of capturing the structure of the world, for instance, in
one of the senses discussed above. Whether structural realism satisfies the no
miracles argument and the extent to which this is sufficient for realism are
contentious matters.
Here I make only a more modest claim: nothing vis a` vis the realism of
structural realism is changed by endorsing pluralism. All that is required is
that (a) theories tell us only about structure (not about traditional realist
ontology) and (b) there is a certain ‘looseness of fit’ between the theory and
the world. As I’ve argued above, (a) is the core of structural realism and (b)
is a requirement on any plausible form of scientific realism.
Thus, pluralist structural realism is not a weakening of the view, but rather
follows from its antecedent commitments. One would have to add something
to standard structural realism to prevent it from allowing for robust pluralism.
So, in a word, if structural realism deserves the title, so does pluralist structural
realism.
7 Application: inequivalent representations in QFT
Finally, let’s briefly consider a potential application of pluralist structural
realism.22 Quantum field theory (QFT) is the framework for some of the most
accurate theories in all of science. However, the ontology responsible for these
successes is unclear. While in some contexts—such as scattering experiments—
QFT seems to invoke a particle ontology, other contexts seem to require a field
ontology. This gives rise to a challenge for the scientific realist who seeks to
explain empirical success by reference to the ontology the theory describes.
Moreover, unlike many other cases used to motivate pluralism, QFT is as
close as we have to a fundamental theory in physics. This means that realists
cannot locate a shared underlying ontology that each of the candidates—fields
or particles—approximate at some higher level of description. It is incumbent
22 For a more detailed treatment, see [xxxx].
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on the realist to tell us what the world is like according to QFT as there is no
more fundamental theory to fill in the details otherwise.
Now, there is a strong similarity between the behavior of quantum field
excitations and particles in the context of QFT. Perhaps the traditional realist
needn’t choose between the two ontologies, but may instead regard both as
approximately true descriptions of the quantum world. The difficulty with this
approach is how to develop it without collapsing into a version of structural
realism. It seems natural to think that what one is committing to in this case
is not an ontology, but a pattern of behaviors—that is, a structure.23 One
promising approach for the traditional realist is Chakravartty’s suggestion to
regard rival ontological proposals as specifications of different metaphysical
natures the same entity could possess. However, as mentioned above (§2.2),
committing to such underdescribed entities invites its own problems. At a
minimum, the traditional realist who seeks to claim that particles and field
excitations are sufficiently similar for the ontology of QFT to be unproblematic
must provide an adequate notion of ontological similarity; otherwise, it remains
unclear what is meant by one kind of ontology approximating another.
For the structural realist, by contrast, the lack of a clear ontology for QFT
isn’t a problem; recall that the Heisenberg and Schro¨dinger versions of QM
also seemed to differ in their (traditional realist) ontological commitments.
But, unfortunately, there are problems lurking for the structural realist as
well. At least on the algebraic understanding of QFT, several inequivalent
structures seem to be required.24
Candidates for the structure of a theory of [QFT] include abstract C∗
algebras, concrete von Neumann algebras, and instances of the latter
which stand to instances of the former as universal enveloping von Neu-
mann algebras. Cast in terms of Structural Realism...: while structures
of each of these types underlie some of the empirical successes of theo-
ries of [QFT] the collection of significant successes enjoyed by theories
of [QFT] defy attribution to a single type of structure. Empirical suc-
cesses mediated by the particle notion, and explanations relating the
energy of quantum field states to that of their classical predecessors,
require the structure of a privileged irreducible Fock space representa-
tion; such a structure stymies the physics of broken symmetry and of
equilibrium at non-zero temperatures. An abstract algebraic structure
broad enough to accommodate a full slate of possible dynamics for QFT
23 This may be what French and Ladyman are worried about when they complaint that
“standard realism without such ‘natures’ is nothing more than an ersatz realism which draws
on the plausibility of a structural description of theoretical objects whilst backing off from
[structural realism] proper”(French and Ladyman, 2003, 36).
24 McArthur (2006) advocates pluralism in the context of the effective field theory ap-
proach to QFT. His emphasis on shared structure across different effective field theories,
however, suggests a weaker pluralism than that allowed by RSP. I haven chosen to focus on
Ruetsche’s discussion of the algebraic approach because it provides a clear point of contact
with structural realism. If the algebraic approach to QFT is misguided, then this application
is a fictional one, but it nevertheless illustrates how pluralist structural realism may be of
use in understanding science.
Pluralist Structural Realism 21
in curved spacetime is too broad to sustain mean field dynamics of the
sort so successful in the thermodynamic limit. The heuristically power-
ful insistence on Poincare´ symmetry disables a full-blooded explanation
of quantum coherence. And so on. (Ruetsche, 2011, 349–350)
This would mean QFT is equivocal not just about (traditional realist)
ontology, but also with respect to structure. One possible structural realist re-
sponse is to seek a common structure shared by the plurality. The main worry,
as argued by Ruetsche, is that the obvious candidate for a shared structure—
the Weyl algebra25—is too weak to support all of the applications of QFT. In
particular, applications involving spontaneous symmetry breaking (SSB) and
thermodynamic phenomena seem to require the use of more specific inequiv-
alent Hilbert space representations. This suggests that the structural realist
cannot rest content with the common structure shared by the inequivalent
representations; doing so would leave them unable to account for important
empirical successes of QFT. A central motivation for structural realism—and
scientific realism in general—is to account for the empirical successes of our
best scientific theories. If the structures endorsed fail to account for significant
successes, then structural realism loses much of its bite. One might instead opt
for an empiricist or pragmatist understanding of inequivalent representations
in QFT.26
French (2012, 2014) offers a variant of the ‘common structure’ approach
which regards each of the inequivalent representations as possibilities unified
in an underlying modal structure. The more specific structures that figure in
SSB aren’t a problem, claims French, because they result from a process that
invokes all of the structures.
In the case of QFT, ... we cannot appeal to isomorphism, but we can
identify an underlying structure. And the inequivalence is tied up with
the asymmetry of the actual phenomena. In order to accommodate
that, we appeal to SSB and the structural realist retains the ontological
emphasis on symmetry. (French, 2014, 320)
For French, the way to resolve the challenge of inequivalent structures in
QFT is to seek an “underlying structure” that they all share. This is akin
to the Superstructure condition rejected above; there must be some common
structure—the real structure—that underlies the success of each of the indi-
vidual ones. The problem is that, as noted above, common structure alone
appears too weak to account for all of the successes of QFT, so French must
invoke something else (SSB), which is then claimed to be ‘structural’ in some
25 Roughly, the Weyl algebra is a set of operators found in every representation of the
canonical commutation relations that characterize QFT. Formally, it is a C∗ algebra. For
an introduction, see Ruetsche (2011, Ch.4).
26 Indeed, Ruetsche’s favored ‘coalescence approach’ has a strong pragmatist element: “the
contingent application of theories does not merely select among some preconfigured set
of their contents, but genuinely alters their contents. It follows that there can be an a
posteriori, even a pragmatic, dimension to content specification...” Ruetsche (2011, 147,
original emphasis).
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other sense. However, if one adopts pluralist structural realism, there needn’t
be such an underlying structure. While there may be important connections
between the inequivalent structures deployed by physicists, they needn’t be
viewed in terms of a superstructure. This allows one to take the models at
face value and regard each of their structures as faithfully representing the
structure of the world modelled by QFT. In this way the pluralist structural
realist avoids leaving hostages to fortune by rejecting the demand for a su-
perstructure or underlying structure for any plurality of inequivalent models.
As the case of QFT shows, there is some reason to be skeptical that future
physics will respect such a demand.
This sentiment is nicely captured by Don Howard in his review of French
and Krause (2006):
If the structural realist is committed to the view that theory affords a
unique structural representation of nature, and if the algebraic point
of view is the right point of view in quantum field theory, then the
structural realist has a problem. My own view is that structuralism
should never have committed itself to a uniqueness claim in the first
place. (Howard, 2011, 231)
The robust pluralist structural realist takes up Howard’s suggestion by allow-
ing that QFT provides us with a plurality of inequivalent structures, each of
which (more or less) faithfully represents the world. Note as well that the
structures involved (a) agree at the limit of non-relativistic QM and (b) share
an underlying structure, namely, the Weyl algebra. The former, together with
the empirical success of QFT, allows that this is an acceptable plurality and
the latter tells us that the Weyl algebra likely reflects a genuine feature of our
world.
The diversity of candidate ontologies for QFT poses a problem for the
traditional realist—that our best-confirmed physical theory resists a single
ontology makes it hard to say that its success is due to getting the ontology
right. However, the diversity of structures does not pose a similar problem for
the structural realist, provided the arguments for adopting RSP go through;
the pluralist structural realist can grant that the multiple inequivalent struc-
tures used in QFT are each successful in virtue of faithfully representing the
structure of the world.
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